Wednesday, July 24, 2019

Aviation Security and al Qaeda in Yemen Case Study

Aviation Security and al Qaeda in Yemen - Case Study Example This pragmatic and preventive practice had been discontinued. An illustration of this change was the failure to interrogate the Christmas Day bomber. This individual had been provided with a lawyer and informed that he was entitled to remain silent (Thiessen, 2011, p. 133). Aggressive interrogation of terrorists is essential for obtaining information about future terrorist attacks. Consequently, the Obama Administration’s reluctance to engage in such interrogation has rendered the nation vulnerable to terrorist attacks. There is a major lacuna in the strategy of the US. It relies upon Yemen to assist it in identifying and neutralizing al Qaeda terrorists. However, the Yemeni government employs, harbors and relies upon these terrorists for political support and perhaps even its very existence. There is a marked reluctance among the Yemeni authorities to wage a serious war against the al Qaeda terrorists, who reside in their country (Rollins, 2010, p. 12). It was discovered by the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States that the weaknesses inherent in the aviation security system had been used by the al Qaeda terrorists to conduct the September 11 attacks. Some of the weaknesses identified by this commission were first, a preliminary screening process that concentrated upon identifying likely aircraft bombers (Elias, 2004). However, this process had ignored potential hijackers. Second, slipshod screening at checkpoints and the prevalence of permissive rules with regard to small knives. Third, the absence of in-flight security measures, such as the presence of air marshals and reinforced cockpit doors. Fourth, the adoption of a non – confrontational strategy, across the industry, while addressing hijackers. Fifth, the absence of capabilities and protocols for executing a synchronized Federal Aviation Administration and military response to suicidal hijackers and multiple hijackings (Elias, 2004).  

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